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Risk Based Passenger Screening in Aviation Security:  
Implications and Variants of a New Paradigm1 
Introduction 
Especially since the 9/11 attacks, travelling by airliner means to be subject 
to ever more intensive security procedures. In order to cope with screening 
for an increasingly diverse spectrum of threats, various actors in the aviation 
sector have promoted a shift in the paradigm of passenger screening. The 
International Air Transport Association (IATA), for example, suggested a 
‘Checkpoint of the Future’ that more efficiently and less intrusively screens 
“different passengers in different ways” based on risk assessment proce-
dures (IATA 2013: 8). As a broader industry initiative, it has since been 
redefined under the name “Smart Security” (IATA 2014). Furthermore, the 
US Transport Security Administration (TSA) has already introduced pas-
senger differentiation and pre-screening programs, and in aviation security 
research, ‘risk based screening’ (RBS) has become a hot topic. While the 
term is often left unspecified, RBS is generally supposed to allow more tar-
geted passenger screening using some form of ‘predictive’ risk data. It is 
hoped that this will allow a higher level of security, lower costs for the avi-
ation industry and passengers, and less impact on the passengers – possibly 
all at the same time. 
The main purpose of this paper is to describe the difference between the 
‘traditional’ form of screening and the new paradigm of ‘risk based (pas-
senger) screening’. I propose to differentiate three main variants of RBS by 
means of the differences in the underlying risk analysis. As I show, even 
under a RBS paradigm, the security measures remain subject to various 
trade-offs and a conflict of interest between the provision of security, the 
	
1  Some of the ideas presented in this paper have been developed as part of the EU 
FP7 project XP-DITE. The main goal of XP-DITE is to develop a new, passenger 
centered approach to the design and evaluation of airport checkpoints that remains 
relevant even after a shift to risk based concepts. The paper is not meant to repre-
sent a shared view of the project consortium as a whole.  
implied costs for the industry and passengers, and ethical, legal and societal 
implications. 
In my paper, I use the terms ‘airport checkpoint (ACP) screening,’ ‘pas-
senger security screening,’ and similar expression interchangeably to de-
note the screening of passengers and cabin bags for a defined set of ‘dan-
gerous’ or ‘prohibited’ items. This definition of the scope of this paper 
means that I will not address various other types of screening practices that 
also happen to take place at airports, but that follow a different rationale, 
use different techniques and address different security concerns. For exam-
ple, I will not address risk based concepts of checked baggage or cargo 
screening. In the same vein, practices of border control and customs checks 
will be out of scope for this paper. Such forms of screening may form part 
of future research. 
My argument is structured into four main parts. In a first step, I briefly 
introduce the ‘traditional’ form of screening that is likely to be familiar for 
most people. In the second part, I then analyse what is actually new with 
regard to RBS. Drawing from Ulrich Beck, Herfried Münkler, Michel Fou-
cault and other authors, I contextualize this change of paradigms in a wider 
cultural and historical development. This contextualization unveils some of 
the fundamental limitations and instabilities of risk management strategies, 
which also apply with regard to risk based approaches to passenger security 
screening. Based on this, I then briefly sketch out what different actors hope 
to achieve with an introduction of RBS concepts in the third part. In the 
fourth part, I then distinguish three variants of the RBS paradigm and ex-
pound the respective underlying assumptions with regard to the provision 
of protection against attackers. For each of the three variants, I also analyse 
the implications from an economic perspective and with regard to ethical, 
legal, and societal issues.2  
	
2  The identification of the relevant ethical, legal and societal aspects is based on a 
framework that includes a typology of ethical and societal issues of passenger 
screening which has been developed as part of the EU FP7 project XP-DITE 
(Volkmann 2013a, 2013b). In this paper I will not introduce this framework or the 
typology in detail in order to focus on the descriptive analysis of the RBS para-
digm. The typology is based on similar efforts from other authors (Guelke 2011; 
Solove 2009), and identifies types of impact in three main categories: (1) privacy 
intrusion due to the revelatory function of passenger screening that I introduce in 
this paper, (2) the discrimination against vulnerable groups with regard to that in-
trusion (i.e. an unfair distribution of privacy intrusions), and (3) contributions to a 
broader development to restrict civil liberties such as the freedom of movement. 
 
	
The traditional screening paradigm 
In broad terms, passenger screening is a measure that is meant to make civil 
aviation more secure. While passenger screening cannot offer added pro-
tection against a range of attack vectors that have appeared over time (e.g. 
shooting down an airplane from the ground, hiding bombs in air cargo, pilot 
suicide), the security measure addresses the specific threat that criminals 
amongst the passengers may attack the airplane. Historically, especially 
two types of attacks proved to be relevant: (1) hijackings (including the use 
of the airplane itself as a weapon against other targets) and (2) bombings of 
airplanes (Kölle, Markarian & Tartar 2011: 93; Price & Forrest 2012: 41). 
Types of items that are considered to substantially facilitate such 
attacks – mainly weapons (guns, knives, explosives) and certain tools – are 
compiled on a list of ‘prohibited items’, which then forms the basis of the 
passenger screening procedures (EU 2010: 16). Commonly, the effective-
ness of the screening procedures is defined by their ability to prevent pas-
sengers from bringing such prohibited items on-board the airplane. Those 
procedures are conducted to a certain degree automatically via detection 
devices, but also manually by security personnel (‘screeners’) along a spec-
ified combination of steps. In this sense, airport passenger screening can be 
defined as a system of detection techniques that screen passengers for pro-
hibited items. 
In order to actually have any gain in the level of security, the screeners 
need to check whether a passenger has hidden away such an item from plain 
view – either on the body or in the luggage they carry along on the plane. In 
this sense, we can identify one function of ACP screening as revealing 
something that is not visible in plain view, i.e. kept private. This is why we 
can say that, to a certain degree, all ACP screening procedures will neces-
sarily interfere with the privacy of all passengers that are being screened. 
Furthermore, ACP screening functions as a type of access control for avia-
tion passengers (Traut et al. 2010: 14). Only passengers that are ‘cleared’ 
can enter the secure area of the airport and board the plane. The logic of 
ACP screening can, thus, be described by these two functions, the revela-
tory function and access control. 
Currently, passengers and cabin bags (including jackets and other items 
that passengers bring along with them into the cabin of the plane) have to 
be screened separately (EU 2010: 12). Which items have to be ‘divested’ 
before the screening process is functionally dependent on the types of 
screening techniques applied. In order for a metal detector to work 
effectively for passenger screening, for example, all metallic items have to 
be divested and screened as cabin baggage. 
For both passengers and cabin bags, two main steps can be differentiated 
in the process of security screening: primary screening on the one hand and 
secondary screening (or alarm resolution) on the other. In the traditional 
(and in the EU still current) paradigm of passenger screening, all passengers 
and all cabin bags are subject to the same primary screening procedures 
(Price & Forrest 2012: 258). Secondary screening, on the other hand, is only 
applied to a part of the passengers – either because of a random selection3 
or due to an alarm in primary screening. The reason for this differentiation 
into primary and secondary screening is the fact that some screening tech-
niques, like a pat-down of a passenger, can detect very reliably whether or 
not a dangerous item is present; however, they require a lot of resources per 
passenger. Therefore, almost all airports in Europe conduct some less re-
source and time intensive form of primary screening: Instead of patting 
down all passenger, they make use of metal detectors and only use the more 
reliable but also more time consuming measures to resolve alarms and on a 
random basis. 
For screening to be concluded, the regulation prescribes that all alarms 
need to be resolved so that the screeners can come to the satisfactory con-
clusion that no prohibited item is present (EU 2010: 12). In order to resolve 
those alarms, secondary screening can include more than one step and some 
steps may also be repeated. Furthermore, following the public outcry over 
the introduction of body scanners that produce an image of the body under-
neath the clothes (Deutscher Bundestag 2010; HIDE and RISE projects 
2010; Zetter 2010), opt-out possibilities were introduced. Such steps of pri-
mary and subsequent secondary screening as well as opt-outs can schemat-
ically be expressed in a cascaded decision tree as shown in a simplified ex-
ample for passenger screening in Figure 1. 
	
3  As opposed to the older regulation (EC 2002: 10), the current publicly accessible 
EU regulation (EC 2008; EU 2010) does not mention these random checks any-
more. From personal experience as well as from what can be learned from the 
literature, however, we can assume that a part of the alarms sounded in primary 
screening are still random alarms. In any case, more detailed information on the 
percentage of passengers subject to random checks are classified due to the fact 
that, otherwise, it would be easier for attackers to calculate their chances to succeed 




Figure 1: Simplified schematics of cascaded screening steps 
Of course, it is de facto not always feasible to apply the same primary 
screening measure to all passengers alike. Persons with reduced mobility or 
with certain medical conditions, for example, may not be able to walk 
through a metal detector portal, and persons in a wheel chair would always 
cause an alarm making this detection measure useless. Consequently, 
checkpoints define alternative procedures for those passengers who cannot 
be feasibly screened using the standard procedure. These alternative proce-
dures can be visualized schematically in a similar way. The complete sys-
tem of screening measures can, thus, be conceptualized as different ‘paths’ 
through the checkpoint. On which path a passenger is screened depends on 
the occurrence of alarms and opt-outs during the process. While, in fact, 
passengers may in the end be screened in different ways, i.e. walk on dif-
ferent paths through the checkpoint, the schematic decision tree of the pro-
cedures is the same for all passengers (unless the procedures are infeasible, 
e.g. due to medical or mobility reasons). 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the organization of the screening pro-
cedures remained rather stable with walk through metal detectors and 
pat-downs as alarm resolution for passengers and single view x-ray screen-
ing and manual bag searches as alarm resolution for cabin bags. Already at 
the end of the 90s, however, several reports pointed at inadequacies of the 
procedures from a security perspective (Price & Forrest 2012: 224–226). 
As a reaction to the 9/11 attacks, then, international standards for screening 
were overhauled, new technologies were implemented and the process 
changed much more dynamically than before (Sweet 2004: 190). The situ-
ation that ensued has been characterized as a ‘reactive approach’ to screen-
ing (Kölle, Markarian & Tartar 2011: 40; 103), in which every attack triggers 

























security measures. In comparison to the situation of the 80s and 90s, this 
reactive approach changed considerably how the revelatory function is per-
formed at airports. New technologies allow to screen for a much broader 
scope of ‘prohibited items.’ For example, newly introduced body scanners 
now allow to screen for non-metallic items during primary screening, and 
many airports have implemented explosives trace detection technologies for 
cabin bag and passenger screening. 
This development has not changed, however, how the access control 
function works. It still functions as a binary exclusion of all persons who 
have not yet been screened for dangerous items and ‘cleared’ in the process. 
This is done by closing-off that part of the airport where passengers board 
the plane. In the aviation security literature, this closed-off zone is also 
called the ‘sterile area’ (Price & Forrest 2012: 228). Consequently, in the 
event that unscreened passengers enter this zone (sometimes called ‘con-
tamination’), all passengers that may have come into contact with them 
have to be screened again (Price & Forrest 2012: 233). By this spatial divi-
sion, the passengers are strictly separated into two groups: cleared passen-
gers and uncleared passengers. In the traditional screening paradigm, fur-
ther differentiation is not necessary and not performed. The separation is 
done on the basis of the alarm/no-alarm-logic of the revelatory function, 
and screening data related to a cleared individual is not stored. The intended 
effect and the standard against which the traditional form of screening can 
be measured, then, is the complete exclusion from the sterile area of all pas-
sengers who may carry prohibited items with them. As an aviation security 
professional is quoted: “We are engaged in a complex game of cat-and-
mouse and it is a truism to say that we must get it right 100% of the time 
whereas the terrorist only needs to get it right once” (Seidenstat 2009: 44). 
In the face of a constant rise in the numbers of passengers each year,4 this 
combination of a reactive expansion of the security measures and the goal 
of 100% exclusion of dangerous items proved to be highly problematic. As 
Klaus-Peter Siegloch, then Chairman of the German Aviation Association, 
said, passenger screening checkpoints have become the chokepoint of every 
airport (Spiegel Online 2011). Consequently, the regulators and the aviation 
industry have been looking for new ways to organize the screening proce-
dures. 
	
4  For example, the number of airline passengers more than doubled since the 9/11-
attacks: While in 2001, the number of airline passengers was estimated at 1.655 
billion, this number rose to 3.441 billion in 2015 (The World Bank 2016). 
 
	
From a theoretical perspective, especially the field of Surveillance Stud-
ies has addressed security measures at the airport relatively early (Adey 
2004). The predominant approach in this field was to make use of Foucaul-
tian concepts like the Panopticon. Consequently, in philosophy and the so-
cial sciences, passenger screening is often considered under the premise of 
being a form of surveillance (Zurawski 2015: 65, 86; Leese 2014a: 31–34, 
50; Adey 2004: 501). If we look more closely at the second main function 
of airport screening, however, we have to raise the question whether this is 
in fact adequate. Rather than resembling the disciplinary mechanism of the 
Panopticon, of spatial parcellation and individualistic discipline (Foucault 
1981: 251–255; Zurawski 2015: 28), the process of access control could be 
seen as being much closer to Foucault’s ‘juridical mechanism’ of a binary 
logic of inclusion and exclusion (Foucault 2014: 19). Further evidence to 
support this can be seen in the terminology used by security professionals 
to describe this binary mechanism of inclusion and exclusion: Concepts like 
‘sterile area’ or ‘contamination’ resemble one of Foucault’s main examples 
for this binary mechanism, the plague, quite well. I will come back to this 
in the next section. 
A new paradigm in passenger screening 
In 2005/2006, the member states of the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO), which currently represents 191 states, agreed upon 
more stongly integrating risk assessment in their aviation security strategies 
(ICAO 2014: xi).5 Within the EU bloc, the implementation of this agree-
ment is part of the regulation labelled EC 300/2008. All measures of EU 
member states that exceed what is mandated by this common standard, the 
so called ‘more stringent measures’, are to be applied on the basis of risk 
assessments (EC 2008: Art. 6). Accordingly, it has been shown that specific 
member states such as Germany increasingly use conceptions of risk rather 
than the security/insecurity distinction when communicating publicly about 
civil aviation (Fischer & Masala 2011: 113–114). 
This change can be seen in the context of a wider development, in which 
the members of the ICAO increasingly want to address the facts that they 
can never fully guarantee security against attacks and that the financial and 
	
5  The details of the standards and recommendations for the security concepts are 
classified, i.e. they cannot be discussed as part of this paper (ICAO 2014: 4–2). 
human resources they are willing or able to spend are limited. In this con-
text, risk assessment concepts are seen as a key to allow a more effective 
allocation of the limited resources (Poole 2009: 9). This means that in avi-
ation, risk based approaches security are very closely connected to eco-
nomic considerations: on the one hand regarding the cost-effective alloca-
tion of resources and, on the other, to limit the ever increasing cost for cov-
ering ever more threat scenarios in passenger screening by redistributing 
the available resources. In this sense, not only governmental actors see po-
tential benefits (with regard to their role as provisioners of security against 
criminals), but economic actors from the aviation industry do so, too. In-
dustry associations like IATA, for example, conduct concept studies to find 
out how a change towards risk based screening can limit the cost for in-
creased security (IATA 2013, 2014). On a broader scope, it can be said that 
economic actors are quite open towards the adoption of risk based concepts 
(Poole 2009: 7–8). This is understandable once we realize that in most EU 
countries, while it is legally possible to finance the passenger screening ef-
forts through national taxes (EC 2008: Art. 5), the security measures are 
financed directly (through ticket prices) or indirectly (through consumption 
at the airports) by the passengers (Poole 2009: 7). Consequently, the avia-
tion industry, certainly has high stakes in finding ways to limit the cost for 
passenger screening. 
This development towards an approach for airport screening that is to a 
wider extent based on risk assessment considerations is embedded in a more 
general cultural change. This context has been discussed extensively for 
some time, e.g. following the works of Ulich Beck (1986; also Giddens 
1991). A common definition of ‘risk’ is that it contains three main aspects: 
(1) a conscious choice of action, i.e. a decision for one option against other 
possible; (2) the ‘negativity’ of possible outcomes of the options; and (3) 
the chances of realization of these outcomes (Rescher 1983: 6–7). 
As Herfried Münkler (2010: 12–19) states, risk assessments always con-
tain both a calculatory and a “playful” or “gambling-related” (spielerisch) 
element. Etymologically, ‘risk’ was coined in the economic context of long-
distance trading by ship in the 14th century. Central to the economic con-
ception of risk is that potential losses can always be compensated. Singular 
instances of risks with their various chances of realization can be insured or 
cleverly put together with other risks so that it becomes highly unlikely that 
the outcome proves ruinous for the trader. Münkler, therefore, concludes 
that for cultures of risk, the point of reference is not security as such, but 
rather compensation (Münkler 2010: 13). A certain ship may be lost at sea, 
but it can be assumed that other ships will safely reach their destination, and 
 
	
this can make up for the monetary losses or allow an insurance scheme. 
Risk strategies, therefore, are quite compatible with an economic perspec-
tive. 
However, this playful approach to threats and dangers also plays an in-
creasingly important role in contexts where compensation of losses seems 
implausible. This becomes clear when discussing ‘aleatory’ strategies and 
techniques of governing in more detail, for which Foucault has coined the 
label ‘security dispositive’. As opposed to approaches that aim at the strict 
exclusion of the unwanted or at a meticulous form of individually internal-
ized discipline, the security dispositive aims at seemingly more liberal 
forms of optimization and management of costs and benefits (Foucault 
2014: 16; Gehring 2008: 155). 
One of Foucault’s examples for this is criminal punishment: While strict 
punishment and disciplination of undesired behaviour still play a significant 
role, cost-benefit analyses increasingly have an important influence, too. 
For example, the costs of criminal punishment are weighed against the costs 
of suffering from criminal behaviour, or the early release of convicted per-
sons against the statistical likelihood of them becoming repeat offenders 
(Foucault 2014: 18–21). Foucault’s argument here is that criminality is 
much more considered under the premise of traits specific to a given milieu. 
Those traits, so is the assumption, can be manipulated in such a way that it 
becomes possible to manage the occurrence of criminality in certain loca-
tions or in certain social strata. This type of strategy does not aim at a perfect 
separation of two groups, but rather at cost-effective interventions that max-
imize positive and minimize negative effects (Foucault 2014: 18; 37). 
This also means that security dispositives do not relate to specific indi-
viduals but rather to a statistical mean of a given milieu, not to voluntary 
action but to potentialities of manifestation within a group (Foucault 2014: 
38–39). On the one hand, this can mean that criminal punishment can be 
relented and freedoms be granted in some circumstances – for example, in 
case of a good prognosis, a convicted criminal may be released early. On 
the other hand, new surveillance and management techniques become nec-
essary in order to collect the necessary data for the prognosis, to check 
whether this type of intervention is overall cost-effective and whether the 
prognoses are reliable. In order to render an uncertain future actionable, risk 
calculations, therefore, involve data collection about the past in order to 
predict various statistical means for a given milieu in an uncertain future. 
“‘Risk’ inherently contains the concept of control … It presumes decision-
making. As soon as we speak in terms of ‘risk’, we are talking about calcu-
lating the incalculable, colonizing the future” (Beck 2002: 40). 
If we follow Foucault in the assumption that security dispositives in the 
sense of aleatory governmental practices do not aim at individuals but at 
statistical means of a milieu, it becomes clear why negativities can be com-
pensated: The success or failure of a governmental programme for the early 
release of convicted criminals on the basis of good prognoses is not deter-
mined with respect to one specific criminal, but with respect to systemic 
effects within specific groups. It may be acceptable if some of those who 
were released early become repeat offenders, so long as the underlying cost-
benefit analysis holds true, i.e. so long as costs are saved and the large ma-
jority does not commit crimes again. For the success of such a programme 
and for the effectiveness of a risk calculus, the effects on a specifiable indi-
vidual are irrelevant, so long as there are enough compensating cases. “Fou-
cault suggests that instead of avoiding risks, security apparatuses embrace 
the concept of risk and profit from the emergence of advanced statistics” – 
not by making unwanted behaviour impossible, but by bringing it into con-
nection with other phenomena that compensate potential, negative effects 
on a societal level (Leese 2014b: 501). 
Of course, this kind of compensation seems to be rather unconvincing 
from the perspective of those who fall victim to one of the few repeat 
offenders. The reason for this is that in such cases, the playful element in 
the risk assessment seems completely out of place. Especially in the field 
of public security provision, the risk approach may therefore be deemed 
inadequate, since most of the time, we do not have the choice to withdraw 
from such a game. As Münkler says, the provision of public security in the 
form of the exclusion of violence in the pursuit of wealth and goods is the 
premise for the idea that risk assessments can work in such a ‘playful’ man-
ner – which is why he assumes that cultures of risk always need to be em-
bedded in worlds of security (Münkler 2010: 14–15). If this is not the case, 
we get mixed up in moral dilemmas that cannot be solved from within the 
logic of risk assessment, i.e. by pointing at costs and benefits. Accordingly, 
Münkler says that modern societies need to complement playful risk strate-
gies with perfectionist security approaches, in order to create sustainable 
forms of security (Münkler 2010: 27). This highlights an important limita-
tion and instability of risk based approaches in aviation security, as there is 
no real choice to withdraw from calculatory games that aim mainly at cost 
reduction.  
With regard to the 9/11 attacks, however, another inadequacy of the risk 
approach becomes apparent that has previously been discussed mainly in 
the context of the environmental debates: the problem of ‘uncontrollable 
risks’. People can always be dangerous to one another, and the possibility 
 
	
of the success of an attack can never be fully excluded. However, the 
potential ‘negativities’ can reach such an extent that they cannot be com-
pensated even on a societal or global level. In aviation security, the stakes 
may be so high that the chances of failure cannot be justified from within 
the risk logic:  
“Specifically in aviation, screening policies necessarily must aim at minimizing 
Type II errors (false negatives), as an individual that was incorrectly assessed as 
harmless while being a potential offender poses the worst-case scenario and could 
cause devastating harm” (Leese 2014b: 496). 
This brings a second important limitation and instability of RBS concepts 
to the foreground. In the light of potential catastrophic societal or global 
effects, the playful element again appears to be out of place. While it was 
possible to compensate the immense monetary loss due to the 9/11 attacks 
through governmental subsidies and credits (Sweet 2004: 12–15), this can 
hardly be said to be the case with respect to the loss of human lives, well-
being as well as with respect to the direct political aftermath on a global 
level, namely the war in Afghanistan.  
Despite such conceptual inadequacies, we can observe a trend in the field 
of public security provision towards more preventive risk based strategies 
in the EU and in many other states. “In post-9/11 security regimes, the ef-
forts of policymakers to capture the future and fold it back into the present 
in order to render it actionable have reached new heights” – for example 
with regard to profiling measures discussed by the EU for the purpose of 
fighting terrorism (Leese 2014c: 497; 495). Thus, aleatory strategies are 
pursued in the fields of public security provision, even when they are not 
embedded in perfectionist forms of security provision and when losses can-
not be compensated in any meaningful way. In such cases, risk strategies 
promise some form of control over the future that they in fact cannot guar-
antee:  
“‘Uncontrollable risks’ must be understood as not being linked to place, that is they 
are difficult to impute to a particular agent and can hardly be controlled on the level 
of the nation state. This then also means that the boundaries of private insurability 
dissolve, since such insurance is based on the fundamental potential for compensa-
tion of damages and on the possibility of estimating their probability by means of 
quantitative risk calculation. So the hidden central issue in world risk society is how 
to feign control over the uncontrollable – in politics, law, science, technology, econ-
omy and everyday life” (Beck 2002: 41).  
While it can safely be assumed that this kind of aleatory approach to ‘un-
controllable’ risks is much more prevalent in ‘risk societies’ of what Beck 
calls the ‘second modernity’, it has been shown from a historical perspec-
tive that such forms of risk based policies have been developed at least as 
early as 1536 for the question of whether it is wise to lead a war against a 
neighbouring territory (Zwierlein 2012). This means that risk assessments 
have been transferred from economic contexts to the realm of governmental 
reasoning almost right from the start, even in cases where losses cannot be 
compensated through insurance schemes or accounted for in cost-benefit-
analyses. This is the context in which we need to consider the current de-
velopments in aviation security regarding approaches to risk based passen-
ger screening. 
It is important to understand that the aforementioned limitations and in-
stabilities at the core of risk management approaches do not disqualify them 
from being applied in the field of aviation security. Similar inadequacies 
can be identified for ‘perfectionist’ strategies of passenger screening, too, 
as we can never totally exclude the possibility of a catastrophic future. How-
ever, it is important to understand that risk based approaches, especially in 
the field of security provision, are not the one-stop rational solution to the 
problem of dealing with uncertain futures that they sometimes appear to be. 
Using risk approaches in contexts where compensation cannot be expected 
comes with a lot of conceptual contradictions and we should be careful not 
to uncritically believe in the promise of control they seem to give. It is there-
fore paramount to further analyse the specific benefits that are expected 
from RBS and how this new paradigm could be implemented in more detail. 
Expected benefits of risk based passenger screening  
As discussed above, traditional forms of passengers screening can be seen 
as excluding attacks from passengers on civil aviation by two basic func-
tions: the revelatory function and access control. As I have mentioned 
above, however, the specific implementation of the two functions comes 
into conflict with other values (e.g. monetary costs or privacy intrusions). 
As I present in this section, one of the main promises of RBS is that it can 
deal with such ‘trade-offs’ in a rational manner. 
In the debate on risk based screening concepts, three main areas play a 
prominent role for the assessment of the implications. Firstly, the level of 
security depends on how reliably the revelatory function performs, i.e. on 
how likely it is that prohibited items are found. At the same time, and 
 
	
secondly, more reliable screening techniques tend to have profound eco-
nomical implications – costs go up and customer satisfaction goes down.6 
In addition to that, thirdly, the introduction of new or more intense screen-
ing measures tends to have ethical, legal and societal implications. For 
example, privacy questions have been at the core of a range of debates deal-
ing with the introduction of the body scanners in Europe or the ‘enhanced 
pat-down’ rules in the US (Deutscher Bundestag 2010; HIDE and RISE 
projects 2010; Zetter 2010). 
Risk based screening (RBS) is meant to address these trade-off situations, 
and some actors in the aviation sector hope that the trade-off trilemma 
between the level of security provision, costs, and ethical, legal and societal 
implications can be solved by it. At the core of RBS concepts is the idea to 
differentiate passengers into different risk groups and accordingly differen-
tiate the intensity of screening, i.e. the amount of resources spent for the 
revelatory function. 
With regard to the provision of security, it is hoped that risk assessments 
can complement the revelatory function of screening with a pro-active 
element. The hope is that this may help improving the likelihood of finding 
prohibited items even if they can currently hardly be detected during pri-
mary screening. Another argument for RBS is that it is paramount for a 
rational approach to screening to focus screening efforts on those passen-
gers that are considered more likely to be attackers than others (Wagner 
2014: 26–28). Critics of RBS, as we will see later on, however, are doubtful 
that passenger differentiation for screening will lead to an increased level 
of security and fear that it may, in fact, lead to adverse effects. 
With regard to ethical, legal and societal aspects, it has been pointed out 
that focussing the intensity of screening efforts on some passengers may 
	
6  One of the major sources of revenue for airports is letting space in the building to 
duty-free shops and other businesses – especially in the ‘sterile area’. Therefore, 
the footprint of a checkpoint is directly negatively related to the space that can be 
let to businesses. More reliable screening techniques like pat-downs or manual bag 
searches usually take more time per passenger. This means that in order to screen 
the same number of passengers per hour, more screeners and more space need to 
be allocated to the checkpoint – which means that the costs increase. Furthermore, 
since displeased persons tend to spend less money on consumption, ‘passenger 
satisfaction’ with the security screening measures has become another major cost 
consideration for airports. Pat-downs, manual bag searches and other reliable, but 
time intensive and more intrusive screening techniqes also tend to displease pas-
sengers more – which means that the amount of rent per square metre that airports 
can ask from the shop owners decreases. 
have discriminatory or stigmatizing effects – e.g. with regard to Muslim 
passengers (Wagner 2014: 29; Georgi 2014: 18). Advantages, on the other 
hand, are seen in the idea that waiting times could be decreased and the 
procedures could be less intensive for the large majority, resulting in less 
inconvenience and less privacy intrusions (AEA 2014; IATA 2013). 
From a cost perspective, a higher level of customer satisfaction for the 
large majority as well as less time and personnel intensive procedures have 
been named as expected positive effects, in addition to the ability to link 
simplified screening procedures with frequent flyer programmes (AEA 
2014; Georgi 2014: 18; IATA 2013). The hope is that a shift in resources 
may limit the constant cost increase or even reduce costs (Wagner 2014: 
30–31; Georgi 2014: 18). Of course, it is by no means necessary that the 
introduction of RBS decreases the costs for the aviation industry and the 
passengers. This depends on the ability to shift resources away from the 
majority of passengers, rather than just add extra measures for some 
passengers. It is interesting in this context, however, that (at least in the 
German public debate) the case for risk based screening is mainly made by 
economic actors (Wagner 2014: 30–31; Georgi 2014: 18). 
Three types of risk based strategies for passenger screening 
As discussed above, the proposal of a risk based approach to screening 
implies some kind of risk assessment as the basis for the design and imple-
mentation of differentiated passenger screening. However, what kind of risk 
analysis is proposed specifically, i.e. what the object of that risk analysis is, 
is hardly ever part of the debate (as an example see Wagner 2014). As will 
become clear in the following discussion, at least three main variants of the 
risk based screening paradigm should be differentiated in the debate on 
RBS, as they imply very different advantages and disadvantages for the 
three areas of implications discussed above (security, costs and ethics).  
It is important to understand that these three variants are not mutually 
exclusive approaches. Instead, they should be understood as different kinds 
of strategies that can be (and in fact are) combined with each other. Even 
when they are combined, however, these strategies remain distinct from 




Situational risk based screening 
A first viable criterion for the distinction of the underlying risk analysis is 
the question whether the goal of the risk analysis is to classify individual 
passengers into different risk groups or to differentiate the use of screening 
resources based on contextual factors. The latter variant of RBS makes use 
of information that is not passenger related but based on broader infor-
mation on the threat situation. 
As an example of this, one could think of a situation in which a large 
amount of plastic explosives has been stolen. Compared with the threat 
situation before the theft, one could assume that there is the heightened risk 
for some airports in the country or region that attackers will try to smuggle 
some of this type of explosive on-board an airplane. A reaction to this 
assessment could be to intensify the search for corresponding explosive 
devices at those airports. Another example could be that the flights are 
differentiated into risk classes, e.g. based on the airline, the point of depar-
ture and the destination, the size or the maximum range of the airplane. This 
type of approach was proposed as part of the Dutch initiative SURE! (van 
de Wetering 2014). Based on such situational criteria regarding the flight or 
the threat situation, the passengers are then differentiated into different risk 
groups. Apart from the flight information, no other passenger-related 
information is necessary for the risk based differentiation, which means that 
any other passenger on the plane can be expected to have undergone the 
same form of cascaded screening procedures. I will call this variant of RBS 
‘situational risk based screening’. 
In order to actually offer a higher level of security, there is a necessity 
for some form of data collection and analysis that allows a meaningful and 
adequate assessment of the threat situation. The increase in security 
provision that can be achieved by situational RBS is, thus, directly related 
to how well the threat situation can be assessed. If this can be done reliably 
and accurately, situational RBS can allow to adjust the screening procedures 
in a much more flexible way, depending on current situational risk assess-
ment. Security-minded designers of airport passenger checkpoints are thus 
enabled to quickly implement new procedures.  
From a cost perspective, on the other hand, situational RBS and a poten-
tial gain in flexibility may imply less reliability in the airports’ or airlines’ 
planning. Depending on how much flexibility is required on behalf of the 
checkpoint operators, differing screening procedures may require more per-
sonnel or lead to longer waiting times for passengers. Moreover, since many 
airports want to guarantee short waiting times for screening, it may be 
necessary to oversupply screening ressources to a higher degree. Airport 
operators cannot always assume that they are able to push the incurring 
costs for this type of flexibility towards the airlines and, consequently, to 
the passengers without further implications for their own business. 
Especially for smaller airports, this concern has been voiced in the past (UK 
Parliament 2012). 
From an ethical and societal perspective, situational RBS does not seem 
to differ profoundly from the traditional screening paradigm at first glance. 
Exceptions to this may be more frequent changes regarding the screening 
procedures so that passengers may be less accustomed to the controls, es-
pecially if they may differ from flight to flight. On a broader perspective, 
however, one major concern could be the question whether it would really 
be politically feasible to decrease the intensity in the screening measures 
for specific flights or specific airports, even after a specific threat seems to 
have resolved. As we have seen above, the risk based approach to screening 
cannot provide a viable rational criterion for deciding that we can take back 
or lower security measures as long as there is still a certain chance, however 
minute, that they may prevent a catastrophic event.7 Therefore, it remains 
unclear to what extent this variant of RBS can limit, stop or even reverse 
the steady increase in the interference with passengers’ privacy and their 
freedom of movement (see also Volkmann 2014: 18–22). 
Another reason for ethical concern with situational RBS is the distinct 
possibility that it may exacerbate potential discriminatory effects8, even 
though passengers are differentiated according to non-personal, context-
related information. In many legal contexts – like the EU – certain groups 
have been specifically recognized as vulnerable, such as groups identifiable 
	
7  As Birnbacher (1996: 201) writes, these kinds of questions refer us back to the 
field of ethics. According to him, the central question of ‘risk ethics’ is ‘How safe 
is safe enough?’. On a metaethical level, the question then is how we can establish 
intersubjective validity when answering that question. 
8  Not only RBS concepts, but also traditional forms of screening may disproportion-
ally affect some groups of passengers. Therefore, a specifiable group may be 
subject to a disproportionately more intrusive screening process. This could be the 
result of an accumulation of errors (e.g. false alarms) or of a different screening 
procedure for certain groups of passengers, either deliberately chosen (e.g. for 
passengers with reduced mobility) or inadvertently happened (e.g. resulting from 
an unforeseen inability to comply). Furthermore, the same screening procedure 
may differ in the level of intrusion for different groups of passengers (e.g. because 




by sex, gender, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, lan-
guage, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, minority status, 
property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation (EU 2010: C 83/396). 
In situational RBS, some of those groups (e.g. ethnic or social origin) may 
be affected disproportionally, as they may more frequently board planes that 
are considered high risk flights. It is not clear, however, which specific 
groups could be affected in this way. Currently, for example, high risk flight 
destinations may include the US or Israel which sometimes already have 
additional checks in place. Nonetheless, since all passengers on board those 
flights face the same procedures, including tourists and business travellers, 
it seems plausible that this risk of discriminatory effects may not or only 
tenably become manifest in many cases. 
Passenger profiling using external risk data 
Variants of RBS that do not use situational threat information but instead 
make use of information on the passengers can be further differentiated into 
two main approaches. On the one hand, there are efforts to allow the 
differentiation of passengers into risk groups based on previously collected 
personal data on the passengers. On the other hand, concepts have been 
proposed and implemented based on behavioural data collected immedi-
ately before or during the screening process.9 In both variants, passengers 
are commonly separated into three risk groups which are then subject to 
procedures that differ with regard to the intensity and the resources applied. 
This can be seen with regard to the concept study ‘Checkpoint of the Future’ 
that was proposed by IATA: Three separate lanes are created to screen 
passengers according to their assigned risk category: ‘enhanced’ for passen-
gers categorized into the higher risk group, ‘known traveller’ for passengers 
with the lower risk assigned (e.g. based on voluntarily submitted personal 
data), and ‘normal’ for all other passengers (IATA 2011).10  
	
9  As will become clear in the course of my argumentation, both variants have already 
been implemented by the Transport Security Administration (TSA) at many air-
ports in the US. 
10  The different screening procedures for the three risk groups can be spatially sepa-
rated into different screening lanes – as with the tunnels in IATA’s concept study. 
This may not be the most cost effective method, however, since the application of 
The main assumption behind passenger profiles-based RBS is that 
attackers are likely to be part of a specifiable group of passengers, that can 
either be effectively defined by intelligence services or statistical calcula-
tions (Adey 2004: 505–506). Correspondingly, the paradigm change is 
sometimes labelled with the slogan “Looking for dangerous persons, not 
(just) for dangerous objects” (Georgi 2014). In order to be able to select 
some specified passengers for more intensive screening measures, however, 
all passengers have to be identified to determine whether they should be 
selected or not. In this sense, the fundamental assumption in this type of 
RBS is also that it can make civil aviation more secure if the responsible 
authorities know the identity of the passengers (Soghoian 2009: 15). 
Although actors in the aviation security sector tend to avoid the word ‘pro-
filing’,11 I believe that it adequately describes the procedures that make use 
of already collected, checkpoint-external data on individual airline 
passengers. I will therefore call this type of differentiated screening proce-
dure ‘passenger profiling based screening.’ 
In current programmes in the US, the differentiation process is usually 
based on lists.12 The risk analysis, thus, is not performed at the checkpoint 
	
three levels of screening intensity can also be integrated in the same lane. The 
screening ressources are then applied dynamically when a passenger is identified 
and then categorized in one of the risk groups (IATA 2013: 19). As part of the 
programme SURE!, trials for a similar dynamic integration started in 2015 at 
Schiphol Airport (Ghee 2015). Passengers can then see only one type of lane, but 
additional screening procedures can be applied dynamically for some passengers 
without it being apparent to them. 
11  Especially in the US, but also in Europe, the word profiling is often seen in close 
relation to racial profiling, and thus avoided. With regard to RBS, there currently 
seems to be no nation-wide or Europe-wide programme for passenger profiling 
comparable to that of the US. In some national political debates, such programmes 
are rather seen with scepticism. In Germany, for example, the political discussion 
on this kind of differentiated passenger screening terminated quickly after oppo-
nents pointed towards the selection programmes (Selektion) in Nazi Germany. 
Prominent polititian Dieter Wiefelspütz, for example, said to the press: “Please cite 
me when I say: This is ‘Selektion’ at the airport – especially in Germany, we will 
have none of this” (Schreiben Sie bitte ruhig: Das ist Selektion am Flughafen – 
gerade in Deutschland wird es das nicht geben) (Weiland 2010; cf. also Georgi 
2014: 18).  
12  Information on the criteria for putting someone on these lists or for assessing the 
likelihood that someone is an attacker have never been made publicly available. 
Furthermore, it is unclear to what degree this is an automated process (as it was 
 
	
as such or by the authority responsible for screening. Instead, the TSA has 
the responsibility to establish the passengers’ identities, to compare them to 
the respective lists, to then categorize the passengers appropriately into one 
of the three risk groups and to screen them accordingly. In addition to that, 
persons that have been put on the so-called ‘no-fly-lists’ are barred from 
entering the secure zone completely (Soghoian 2009: 15). With regard to 
the categorization of passengers, the US programme ‘Pre’ allows passen-
gers to apply for less restrictive screening procedures. The relevant 
programme for the comparison of passengers with the selectee lists and the 
no-fly-lists, on the other hand, is called ‘Secure Flight’ (US TSA 2014a). 
These lists are comprised as an application oriented subset of the terrorist 
watch lists.13 This means that the profiling itself is not performed by the 
	
conceptualized for the programmes CAPPS I and II). Of course, it is highly prob-
lematic to use aleatory or statistical approaches in situations when there are 
extremely rare cases to provide the underlying statistical data (Press 2009). If it is 
true, however, that there is too little viable data with regard to aviation security for 
such statistical approaches, we have to ask the question whether the relevant 
authorities satisfy this statistical ‘need for more cases’ not so much by assessing 
the probability of an imminent attack directly, but by assessing the probability of 
someone belonging to a group that has been categorized as dangerous (e.g. ‘reli-
gious extremists’). If that would be the case, it would exacerbate the lack of viable 
validation criteria, since the viability of the classification is based on further prob-
lematic presumptions – for example that we actually know which groups pose a 
threat to civil aviation. 
13  In general, we can probably safely say that the current practices of list compilations 
in the fight against terrorism are incompatible with fundamental democratic and 
human rights principles like the rule of law or the right to effective remedy – mostly 
due to the strict classification of nearly all details about these lists. This discussion 
however, is out of scope for this article, since the procedures for classification are 
not strictly part of the screening process. The no-fly-lists, for example, take effect 
before the screening process even starts as affected persons are usually not stopped 
and questioned by other authorities. This does not mean, however, that those lists 
are not used at the airport or even at the checkpoint in the search for suspected 
terrorists and that these practices would not raise severe issues. For example, from 
a rule of law perspective, it is hard to digest what happened to the Canadian and 
Syrian citizen Maher Arar: Due to inaccurate intelligence information, he was de-
tained during a changeover of planes in New York without formal charges or ac-
cess to a lawyer. Later on, he was brought to Syria against his will, where he was 
held for over 10 months in solitary confinement and was recurrently tortured. Sub-
sequently, he was found innocent both by the Syrian government and in an official 
TSA, but by another branch of the Department for Homeland Security.14 
Information on these lists is mostly confidential and, thus, quite sparse. By 
2009, about 44.000 people are said to have been put on the no-fly-lists and 
about 75.000 people on the selectee lists (Soghoian 2009: 15). In addition 
to that, many of the known top terrorists are supposedly not even on these 
lists as the authorities fear that forwarding these names to other branches of 
the government may compromise intelligence activities (Kroft 2006; quoted 
from Soghoian 2009: 15). In 2007, Canada has established a similar pro-
gramme under the name of ‘Passenger Protect’, which includes a form of 
no-fly-lists (Government of Canada 2014). 
With regard to designing airport checkpoints, this implies the security 
requirement that for each of the passenger risk groups, adequate and reliable 
screening procedures are implemented. Therefore, the effective level of 
security that can be offered by the checkpoint is directly dependent on the 
reliability that attackers are classified by law enforcement agencies – and 
increasingly also by intelligence services – as high risk passengers. While 
it remains true that the level of protection against attacks on civil aviation 
is directly related to the detection probability of prohibited items, this prob-
ability is now also dependent on the risk classification of the passenger.15 
	
Canadian investigation. He was set free and received an apology from the Cana-
dian government (Soghoian 2009: 16–17). 
14  This division of labor, authority and responsibility makes it very hard to establish 
a more complete picture of the profiling activities. None of the decision criteria 
show up in the public documents on the TSA programmes Secure Flight und Pre. 
Furthermore, they are generally not subject to any publicly available scientific 
assessment (Bonß 2014: 8, 10). The TSA’s ‘privacy impact assessments’ on these 
programmes – which are mandatory in the US – only refer to the data that is 
collected for the specific activity of ‘list matching’ (e.g. US DHS 2012: 6). As far 
as I could establish, the Office of Intelligence of the US Department for Homeland 
Security forms the relevant point of contact to the complex web of US intelligence 
services (Price & Forrest 2012: 147, 158). 
15  In the research literature, there is no consensus on whether this kind of passenger 
differentiation based on profiling could be undermined by a group of intelligent 
attackers, e.g. by testing which members of the group are classified as high risk 
and which are not. Depending on the specific implementation, it is also plausible 
that RBS may in fact decrease the level of security (Chakrabarti & Strauss 2002). 
In addition to that, some authors dispute the idea that it is mathematically feasible 
to use a form of statistical risk management in order to build profiles that help 
preventing extremely rare cases of attacks (Press 2009). Furthermore, it has been 
disputed that a checkpoint that makes use of the passenger profiling variant of RBS 
 
	
In addition to that, in order to prevent attackers from being able to predict 
the procedures and adjust to them accordingly, it will remain necessary to 
randomly select passengers for additional screening measures – e.g. by 
moving them to a higher risk category. 
As discussed before, applying passenger profiling at airport checkpoints 
makes it also necessary to identify all passengers at the checkpoint, so that 
they can be reliably classified in the ‘correct’ risk category. The level of 
security the checkpoint can offer is, thus, also dependent on how tam-
perproof the identification mechanism is – otherwise an attacker could 
spoof the identity of another passenger in order to be screened less 
intensely. However, such identification processes – e.g. via the passport – 
are notoriously unreliable. It is therefore hoped that biometric technologies 
allow increasing the protection against falsification of documents as well as 
the level of automation (Skillicorn 2008).16 One problem with using bio-
metrical passports for reliable identification is, however, that they are not 
mandatory in all countries. Thus, an attacker can currently still choose from 
a range of nationalities for a forged passport without biometric security. 
Furthermore, mandatory biometrics cannot help in the cases of state spon-
sored attacks, where attackers have access to ‘legitimately’ issued 
documents. 
In their concept study, IATA considered the use of an iris scanner (IATA 
2011), but another probable candidate for this would be fingerprint based 
biometrics. Passengers could have the necessary personal data stored in a 
shared database for more convenient identification processes. The possibil-
ity to make widespread use of biometric data that have already been stored 
for other purposes (e.g. for issuing biometric passports) would be highly 
problematic in the EU due to the current regulations on data protection. 
From an economic perspective, differentiated passenger screening pro-
cesses make it necessary to reliably predict how many passengers will be 
classified into which risk category at which times, so that the use of screen-
ing resources can be planned efficiently. Overall, it seems plausible, 
	
can guarantee a higher level of security than traditional forms of screening at the 
same level of costs (Martonosi & Barnett 2006).  
16  When Bonß raises the question, how and according to which criteria biometric 
technologies are meant to allow a reliable differentiation between ‘dangerous’ and 
‘harmless’ persons (Bonß 2014: 8), we can answer that this is not meant to be a 
function of biometrics in RBS at all. Biometrics, so it is hoped, allow a more reli-
able proof of identification so that an attacker cannot simply use an identity that is 
‘untainted’ in order to be categorized as a low risk passenger.  
however, that by making use of the profiling variant of RBS, airports can 
on average screen passengers more quickly and, thus, save costs and offer 
shorter waiting times to passengers (Lazar Babu, Batta & Lin 2006; Nie et al. 
2009). Additionally, the profiling variant of RBS may allow the aviation 
industry to offer certain groups like frequent travelers access to less inten-
sive screening procedures – provided the authorities offer some form of 
voluntary background checks and amend the lists accordingly. 
From an ethical and societal perspective, the difference between profile 
based passenger differentiation and traditional screening concepts becomes 
especially apparent when the different risk categories are screened on sep-
arate lanes. More intensive screening for ‘high risk passengers’ requires that 
all passengers will be subject to some form of identification.17 As discussed 
before, since passports and other travel documents are susceptible to for-
gery, this identification may involve biometric forms of identification. 
Depending on the details, biometric technologies can be implemented in a 
privacy respecting or in an intrusive manner. While biometric data is gen-
erally considered personal and sensitive and while such data even enjoys a 
higher level of legal protection (Petermann & Sauter 2002: 11), biometric 
information can be used both to verify passengers identity against an official 
identity token (e.g. the newer electronic passports), and to identify a passen-
ger against a large database of previously collected fingerprints. In the 
former example, the biometric information can be processed in such a way 
that it is never stored outside of the tokens in the possession of the passen-
ger, which limits the privacy impact and the potential for misuse of 
biometric data. In the latter example, on the other hand, the large scale 
collection and use of biometric data would raise severe ethical and legal 
concerns regarding questions of data protection, privacy and the potential 
for misuse by governments and criminals. 
Apart from this potential issue regarding the use of biometric data, it 
seems plausible that a majority of the passengers may, indeed, be subject to 
less intensive screening measures. Thus, it may indeed be possible to limit 
the impact of some forms of privacy intrusions for them. It may be possible, 
for example, to reduce the rate of random secondary screening, which often 
involves more intrusive measures such as pat-downs by screeners and 
manual bag searches. This may be especially true for a smaller number of 
	
17  Depending on the specific procedures, this may be required for traditional forms 
of screening, as well. Since traditional screening procedures are not dependent on 
the passengers’ identity, however, it is still (as of 2016) possible for some flights 
within Schengen area to board the airplane without showing any identification. 
 
	
passengers categorized in the low risk group. At the same time, the majority 
of passengers, but again especially passengers in the low risk group, may 
also face much less restrictions in their freedom of movement. 
On the other hand, this also means that at least some passengers are con-
stantly subject to the more intensive and restrictive measures – which has 
already raised a number of questions regarding discriminatory effects 
(ACLU 2005). Furthermore, opaque decision and classification criteria may 
undermine the legal protection against discrimination (Leese 2014c). As has 
been discussed in the research literature, ‘known traveler’ programmes like 
‘Pre’ may additionally reproduce socio-economic inequalities as they trans-
fer differentiations and classifications from the private economy sector to 
the public security sector (Leese 2014b: 47). 
Due to the necessary element of randomization, it will not be possible to 
guarantee that passengers will always be categorized in the same way. 
Depending on the level of transparency in the implementation, it is therefore 
also possible that a passenger may never be able to say for sure whether 
they have in fact been categorized in the higher risk category: Even when 
they are repeatedly subject to intensified screening procedures, this may 
simply be due to random selection. Since the relevant lists are highly con-
fidential due to the sensitive nature of the information in them, this may 
make it impossible to explain to the affected passengers why they have been 
put on the lists and to offer an effective way to legally challenge such 
decisions – a fundamental requirement regarding the rule of law and for 
modern democracies in general. A case in point for this concern is the story 
of Rahinah Ibrahim, who was officially confirmed to have been put on the 
list by mistake. Despite the fact that the responsible agent testified to this 
error in court, she had to endure an undeniably Kafkaesque18 eight-year 
legal process until she was officially notified that she was removed from 
the list (Boo Su-Lyn 2014). 
“US District Court Judge William Alsup also noted that the US government had 
placed Rahinah on its Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) in October 2009 by 
using a ‘secret exception’ – which was deemed a state secret – to the reasonable 
	
18  Apart from the fact that the government tried to invoke national security exceptions 
to keep any procedural details regarding the lists confidential (including whether 
Rahinah was in fact still on these lists), she was at one point seemingly removed 
from the lists and allowed to fly abroad, only to find that she was put back on the 
list and was denied reentry into the US and, thus, was potentially without standing 
in the relevant court of justice (Boo Su-Lyn 2014).  
suspicion standard, defined as articulable facts that reasonably warrant the determi-
nation that an individual is engaged in terrorism.” (Boo Su-Lyn 2014)  
In addition to that, there have been a number of cases in which passengers 
have been mistaken for suspected terrorists as their names matched or were 
very similar to one of a terrorist’s aliases (e.g. The Telegraph 2012). As a 
reaction to such cases, the TSA has created a ‘redress system’ for passen-
gers who assume that this may be the case for them. In order to prevent the 
more intensive screening procedures, they can ‘voluntarily’ submit a range 
of documentation to establish their identity and receive a ‘redress number’ 
that they can submit for future travels (US TSA 2006: 9).19 The Canadian 
‘Passenger Protect’ programme has faced similar problems in the past 
(Humphreys 2013; The Globe and Mail 2014). 
As discussed above, apart from the passengers’ identities, few personal 
data is collected and assessed in the screening process itself. Of course, this 
is due to the fact that during screening, only some form of list matching is 
performed, i.e. the collection and processing is done at an earlier stage 
someplace else. Since it is highly opaque what kind of data is used by whom 
and to what purpose and extent in order to assess which persons should be 
on such lists, the impact that is posed to passengers’ private lives is very 
hard to specify.  
What is very clear however is the fact that the use of passenger profiling 
also creates a higher demand for mass surveillance activities. This is due to 
the fact that – as stated above – any added security and/or any reduction of 
costs at the same guaranteed level of security is directly dependent on the 
validity and completeness of these lists. This means that the protection 
against attacks from other passengers during the flight becomes directly de-
pendent on the validity and completeness of intelligence gathering on any 
potential attacker of aviation security. The susceptibility of passenger 
screening to ‘false negatives’, i.e. the fact that missing something can 
always prove catastrophic, also holds true for the intelligence and law en-
forcement activities that produce these lists. By making the effectiveness of 
passenger screening at least in part directly dependent on the effectiveness 
of intelligence gathering, it is very likely that we also see a heightened 
demand for more surveillance activity at large. Since the sweeping surveil-
lance activities have proven to rely also on the misuse of personal data, e.g. 
from electronic communications or non-public data from social media, we 
can conclude that the passenger profiling variant of RBS is likely to also 
	
19  Of course, it is highly problematic in itself to assume in such a situation that this 
information has been submitted ‘voluntarily’. 
 
	
create a higher demand for highly sensitive and potentially illegally 
collected surveillance data on as many passengers as possible. 
Behavioural analysis of passengers 
Strategies of the third type of risk based screening, i.e. passenger differen-
tiation techniques based on behavioural data collected immediately before 
or during the screening process, are based on the following psychological 
hypothesis: Attackers will unwittingly show certain behavioural peculiari-
ties that can hardly be controlled by them. Trained security personnel can 
then engage in an interaction with each of the passengers and pay attention 
to these peculiarities. The fundamental idea behind this is that it is thus pos-
sible to detect ‘bad intent’ and use that as a basis for risk assessment (US 
DHS 2013: 2–4; US GAO 2013: 8; Weinberger 2010: 414). Similarly to the 
above mentioned slogan ‘looking for bad people, not bad objects’, this form 
of RBS is sometimes characterized as ‘looking for bad intent’ (Georgi 2014: 
14). 
One form of behavioural analysis based passenger differentiation – 
which has been implemented by the TSA as part of the ‘Screening Passen-
gers by Observation Techniques’ (SPOT) programme – refers to a prede-
fined set of ‘behavioural cues’ that are said to indicate elevated levels of 
stress, fear or the intention to deceive. From the flow of passengers, some 
are then selected for additional screening measures. Similarly, passengers 
can also be categorized as low risk (‘managed inclusion’), when their 
behaviour is assessed accordingly. For the TSA’s behavioural analysis 
activities, the SPOT process for detecting ‘bad intent’ has officially been 
described as follows:  
“BDOs [Behavioral Detection Officers] scan passengers in line and engage them in 
brief verbal exchanges while remaining mobile. BDOs identify passengers who ex-
hibit clusters of behaviors indicative of stress, fear, or deception. BDOs identify 
passengers exhibiting behaviors that exceed SPOT point threshold for referral 
screening.” (US GAO 2013: 10) 
With regard to ‘managed inclusion’ the TSA writes the following: 
“TSA leverages a number of programs so that travelers may receive expedited 
screening when they travel. Passengers in [such] lanes generally move quicker com-
pared to standard lanes, as those passengers leave their shoes, light outerwear, and 
belt on while keeping their laptop in its case and their 3-1-1 compliant liquids/gels 
bag. Managed Inclusion combines the use of multiple layers of security to indirectly 
conduct a real-time assessment of passengers at select airports.” (US TSA 2014b) 
As has been the case for the passenger profiling variant of RBS, the details 
on the specific criteria in these procedures – i.e. on the behavioural cues – 
are considered security sensitive and are therefore classified. However, the 
scientific basis for these programmes has been fundamentally put into ques-
tion in the past, as the empirical evidence does not seem to support that such 
criteria are effective. Instead, some studies suggest that the probability of 
detecting deception is hardly higher than pure chance (Ormerod & Dando 
2015; Weinberger 2010; US GAO 2013: I). 
With regard to the high training and personnel costs for the behavioural 
detection officers, it is therefore unclear from an economic perspective 
whether this programme can be justified from a cost-benefit point of view. 
Consequently, the US Government Accountability Office has recom-
mended to limit funding for the SPOT programme (US GAO 2013: I). With 
potential cost savings in mind, however, there are some efforts to develop 
automated behavioural analysis mechanisms with the use of sensors 
(Weinberger 2010: 415; Rogers 2014) – essentially, one could think of the 
use of automated lie detectors. The extent to which an automated analysis 
of behavioural cues may allow a more reliable detection of ‘bad intent’ 
remains unclear, however.20 
At the current stage, problems of added costs can at least to a certain 
degree be compensated by measures such as managed inclusion, where 
some passengers are screened less intensely. When a certain part of the 
passengers are screened using less resources, this can make up for the added 
costs of training, staff and more intensive screening measures. In addition 
to that, in situations where the risk groups are spatially separated (as it is 
the case in some TSA checkpoints), managed inclusion can help to ensure 
that the use of the lanes is well balanced. However, one has to understand 
that – since the effectiveness and reliability of the detection of attackers is 
unclear – behavioural analysis that makes use of managed inclusion ceases 
	
20  The fact that, even though several scientific studies have dismissed such techniques 
as ineffective, such programmes have reached operational status (i.e. are not in a 
trial phase) and are well financed is in itself an interesting object for research. One 
important factor in this context is certainly that authors in the security research 
sector can at times avoid a critical discussion of their claims by a wider scientific 
audience when they point towards a need to keep parts of their findings 
confidential. In a wider context, however, there also seems to be a problematic 
understanding of science at work, in which many people seem to uncritically 
believe that statistical algorithms and the knowledge of psychological or physio-
logical processes give an epistemic power to initiated scientists that is not 
obtainable for a critally thinking public. It is fitting that Sascha Lobo labelled this 
situation as the ‘hour of the security esotericists’ (Lobo 2014).  
 
	
to act as what the TSA calls an ‘added layer of security’ (US TSA 2014b, 
2015). This interpretation of the SPOT programme as added security is to a 
certain degree also represented in the research literature (Seidenstat 2009: 
9). The metaphor, however, ceases to adequately represent what is happen-
ing, since whenever an attacker is mistakenly included in the low risk 
category, it can in fact decrease the probability of detection of dangerous 
items by the checkpoint. In those cases, it would thus be more fitting to call 
behavioural analysis more neutrally a modifying security measure rather 
than an added layer of security. 
Instead of relying on the interpretation of behavioural cues, a second ap-
proach to behavioural analysis is based on the idea that longer interactions, 
such as structured interviews, can more reliably reveal whether someone is 
trying to deceive the security staff. Such structured interviews have been 
used in Israel for some years now. Here, the interactions take between some 
minutes and several hours (Wagner 2014: 23). This form of behavioural 
analysis is based on the hypothesis that in order to maintain a lie, we have 
to spend more cognitive effort. As a result of this, the amount of detail given 
in the interviewee’s answers will deviate, depending on whether he or she 
is trying to maintain a lie or telling the truth. For example this could be a 
curious lack of detail in lengthy statements when asked to elaborate on the 
claimed background of the trip. A publicly available study supports the 
hypothesis that this technique may indeed help to detect persons who are 
trying to deceive the interviewer (Ormerod & Dando 2015). From a security 
perspective, this form of behavioural analysis therefore seems to offer some 
genuine advantages. 
What is problematic for this type of behavioural analysis from an 
economic perspective is of course that the costs of operation increase drasti-
cally depending on the length of the interactions. It, thus, increases the 
challenge for concepts like ‘managed inclusion’ to make up for these higher 
costs. Especially at bigger airports, where an enormous amount of passen-
gers have to be screened at peak times as fast as possible, longer interactions 
create prohibitive delays, as has become clear in the public debate on this 
‘Israeli model’ of screening in the US (USA Today 2010). 
From an ethical, legal and societal point of view, it can be said that both 
types of the RBS that make use of behavioural analysis may have a positive 
impact on some privacy aspects prominent in passenger screening. Depend-
ing on the specifics of the risk categorization, it seems plausible that a 
majority of passengers may less often be subject to secondary screening 
procedures that have a high privacy impact such as pat-downs or manual 
bag searches. Since the behavioural cue approach does not seem to make 
use of background information on the passengers’ private life, this form of 
privacy impact remains low, too. For the structured interview approach to 
behavioural analysis, however, this may be different. It is, however, highly 
dependent on the type of questions to be answered. What is clear is that, due 
to the longer interactions and the requirement to answer truthfully, the 
implementation of such a measure in an EU context would mean that 
passengers’ freedom of movement would be further restricted. 
From an ethical and societal perspective, furthermore, the behavioural 
cue model’s reliance on decision criteria that are hard to assess objectively 
may exacerbate effects of a categorization based on conscious or un-
conscious prejudices. Experiences from the US show that even from within 
the ranks of the BDOs, some believe that it aggravated systematic discrimi-
nation. For example, the New York Times writes: 
“More than 30 federal officers […] say the operation has become a magnet for racial 
profiling […] ‘They just pull aside anyone who they don’t like the way they look – 
if they are black and have expensive clothes or jewellery, or if they are Hispanic,’ 
said one white officer, who along with four others spoke with The New York Times 
on the condition of anonymity.” (Schmidt & Lichtblau 2012) 
Since the decision criteria are not only classified but since it is also very 
hard to assess whether they have been applied correctly by a BDO, it seems 
almost impossible for passengers to challenge such decisions. The 
opaqueness of the decision processes, thus, also leads to a lack of accounta-
bility, which means that the TSA’s emphatic claim to the objectivity of the 
programme (US DHS 2013: 2) can hardly be challenged or proven – neither 
in general nor in specific cases. 
Conclusion 
The main purpose of this paper was to analyse and describe what changes 
from ‘traditional’ forms of screening are implied when actors promote con-
cepts of ‘risk based (passenger) screening’. My argument followed four 
main steps. In the first part, I argued that passenger screening performs two 
main functions in order to reach its goal of protection against hijacking and 
bombing attacks on airplanes by preventing passengers from bringing pro-
hibited items on-board with them: the revelatory function and access 
control. In the traditional form of screening the two functions implicitly 
follow the idea of absolute exclusion of passengers that carry such items. 
The recent ‘reactive mode’ of adding ever more security measures when-
ever there has been a successful or unsuccessful attack on aviation security, 
however, is seen as unsustainable in the long term by many actors in the 
 
	
field of aviation security, due to the incurring costs and the heightened 
awareness of ethical, legal and societal concerns.  
In the second part of the paper, I then presented what some actors per-
ceive as a solution to the trade-off trilemma between security provision, 
costs, and ethical, legal and societal implications: a risk based approach to 
screening that is based on differentiating passengers according to some 
form of risk assessment. As I have outlined, this ‘paradigm shift’ can be 
seen in the context of a larger cultural development towards governmental 
strategies of risk management. In this discussion, it also became clear that 
such forms of risk assessments have their own instabilities and limitations, 
for example when dealing with ‘uncontrollable risks’ or in the field of 
‘security provision’. Since in such contexts, which are both relevant for avi-
ation security, losses cannot be adequately compensated, decision problems 
cannot be solved rationally from within the risk logic of costs and benefits. 
This means that using risk approaches for passenger screening introduces 
conceptual contradictions that should warn us to not uncritically believe in 
the promise of control they seem to give. For a more detailed view on the 
various implications of risk based screening, it therefore proved paramount 
to further analyse the specific benefits that are expected from this paradigm 
shift and how they play out in different variants of RBS. 
In the third part of the paper I then outlined the main lines of conflict for 
decision problems with regard to passenger security screening as a trade-off 
trilemma. I showed that actors in the field of aviation security hope to 
address this trilemma by means of using risk based approaches to differen-
tiated passenger screening. 
In the fourth part, I proposed a systematic differentiation between three 
main variants of the RBS paradigm based on differences in the underlying 
risk assessment and based on the different implications for the trilemma 
between security, cost and ethics. A first distinction was made between RBS 
concepts that differentiate groups of airline passengers according to 
contextual data regarding the general threat situation and those that 
differentiate according to data related to the passengers themselves. I called 
the former variant of RBS ‘situational risk based screening’. A second dis-
tinction was then made between RBS variants that differentiate passengers 
according to previously collected personal data on passengers and those 
that differentiate according to behavioural data collected immediately 
before or during the screening process. I called the second variant ‘profiling 
based passenger screening’ and the third variant ‘behavioural analysis based 
passenger screening.’ 
It was not my intention in this article to provide an extensive normative 
evaluation or answer the questions of whether the paradigm shift towards 
RBS is worth pursuing or should be avoided. I believe that this question can 
only be answered in a detailed and public assessment of the likely outcomes 
of a specific programme. I believe, however, that such an assessment will 
have to follow the areas of conflict outlined in this paper. And I also believe 
that it will then be necessary to make a choice regarding what is meant to 
be the fundamental goal in introducing risk based screening concepts. Do 
we want to provide more security, reduce costs, or do we want to reduce the 
ethical, legal and societal impact of airport passenger screening? 
In order to provide a meaningful contribution to the public and political 
debate on the future of passenger screening, any evaluation of the positive 
and negative implications of RBS will need to take into account that risk 
strategies will not ‘solve’ this trilemma, but rather have a considerable im-
pact on the relevant trade-offs between security, costs, and various ethical, 
legal and societal aspects such as privacy, the freedom of movement, dis-
crimination, transparency, accountability, and a heightened demand for 
mass surveillance or personal data. I hope that I have made a contribution 
to this necessary debate by making clear that many of the severe problems 
that I have highlighted are not mere historical accidents, but are rooted in 
the very basis of the trade-offs implied to a considerable degree by the 
underlying risk analysis. 
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